

Date

8/18/62

## Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified  
☐ Confidential  
☐ Secret  
☒ ~~Secret~~ Secret\*  
☐ SCI\*

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Letter \_\_\_\_\_ Airtel \_\_\_\_\_  
 LHM \_\_\_\_\_ Memo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Report X \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Teletype \_\_\_\_\_

FD-501 Number

HQ-85-2179

FD-502 Number

Subject

William W Baldwin

Date of Mail

8/18/62

Description of Material

Report-00-WFO

(Include identity of originating office or agency)

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11/16/96 10212 HIC/sal/pat

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EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)  
DATE 06-07-2010

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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FIELD OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
WASHINGTON FIELD	WASHINGTON FIELD	8/18/62	7/26/62 - 8/17/62
TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY	
ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN "THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962	ROBERT C. BYRNES 4/19/99	kmm	
CHARACTER OF CASE		DECLASSIFIED BY: 60324 UC BAW/	
ESPIONAGE - X		353872	

255851  
Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR  
3-2-000 [redacted] Agency  
REFERENCE  
2-24-82 [redacted] 1-7-2006-11

REFERRAL DOCUMENT	
FBI/PA #	111-111-111
APP Referral/Consult	
CIVIL ACT. #	
Z.O. #	12354
INITIALS	SNY

(U) Bureau telephone call to WFO 7/26/62

- P -

## ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

During the 7/30/62, interview of [redacted] Washington, D.C., office of "The New York Times", she indicated she had contacted one Lieutenant [redacted] (phonetic) and Commander [redacted] at the Department of the Navy to arrange for appointments for BALDWIN. The current Department of Defense Telephone Directory lists one Lieutenant [redacted] Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON, JR., Chief of Naval Operations. Inasmuch as ANDERSON was interviewed and acknowledged meeting with BALDWIN, Lieutenant [redacted] is not being interviewed. [redacted] through whom [redacted] reported she made an appointment for BALDWIN, is not being interviewed inasmuch as he

APPROVED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE:	65-67669-125	22 AUG 21 1962
⑦ - Bureau (65-67669) ① - New York (65-16201) (Info) (RM) ② - Washington Field (65-8755)	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE	

Copy - B.C. dist.  
for [redacted]

Downgraded to Secret on  
4/12/10 per 60324 UC BAW/  
DK/AS

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1062  
Report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither

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is not on a level contacted by BALDWIN.(U)

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In view of their immediate unavailability in the Washington, D.C., area and in the absence of additional information dictating to the contrary, the following individuals, familiar in some degree with the subject matter on which this investigation was based or with BALDWIN, are not being interviewed:

General CLYDE D. EDELMAN (retired)  
Route 4, Box 356,  
Lake Charles, Louisiana

Lieutenant General JOHN K. GERHART  
ENT Air Force Base,  
Colorado Springs, Colorado

Lieutenant General THOMAS P. GERRITY  
Commander, Ballistic System Division,  
Air Force Unit, P.O. Box 45,  
Los Angeles, California

Colonel H. M. HENINGTON, USAF,  
Joint Strategic Survey Council,  
who is on a "critically ill" list

Lieutenant Commander [redacted]  
who departed for Singapore on 7/11/62

Lieutenant General HOWELL M. ESTES  
(Hyland Panel member),  
Air Force Systems Command,  
Inglewood, California

Colonel EARL MC FARLAND, Former Chairman,  
GMAIC, who left on 6/29/62, for  
assignment in Alaska. MC FARLAND's  
address is 6981 Radio Group (Mobile),  
USAFSS, APO 942, Seattle, Washington

[redacted] whose return from  
[redacted] is indefinite according to [redacted]  
[redacted] Office of Director, U.S. Arms  
Control and Disarmament Agency

- C -

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(U) \_\_\_\_\_

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
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The August 3, 1962, issue of "Time" magazine carried an article relating to Department of Defense and "those young men in Mufti". In this [redacted] along with [redacted] and ADAM YARMOLINSKY were described as "the Pentagon's whiz kids".

The identities of Agents participating in this investigation are as follows:

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b7c

Inspector DONALD E. MOORE

SA DOUGLAS M. BROWN

SA ROBERT C. BYRNES

SA CARL E. GRAHAM

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA HOMER W. SCHWEPPE

SA MAURICE A. TAYLOR

SA RICHARD M. WOOLF

Referral/Consult

(U)

Set out below are the numbers of persons in various agencies who had access to the document itself, drafts of same, collateral material in connection therewith, and who had the benefit of briefings regarding the material. The DIA furnished data regarding agencies within the Department of Defense with the exception of the Air Force and the Navy, which agencies furnished separate lists. These lists and those furnished by other agencies were complimented through inquiry during the investigation. [redacted]

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numbers set forth below total 710 and are derived from figures obtained during the investigation

[REDACTED] No figures were available regarding persons exposed to the material in other forms previously mentioned.

Air Force

160

Office Secretary of Defense

77

Army

12

Navy

16

AEC

8

State Department

34

Budget Bureau

4

Treasury

1



USIB Secretariat

3

DIA

116

WSEG

8

JCS

36

White House

8

Joint Staff

16

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INFORMANTS

Identity

~~(S)~~ [WF T-1 is] WF 1384-S\*

[WF T-2 is] NY 3698-S\* ] ~~(S)~~ U

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Careful consideration was given to the sources concealed and T symbols were utilized only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will interview the following individuals at the earliest possible occasions following their scheduled returns to the Washington, D.C., area:

- (U) ~~(S)~~ 1. Rear Admiral TURNER CALDWELL, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, who will be available about 8/20/62.
2. Lieutenant Colonel [redacted], Office of Assistant Chief, Intelligence, (ACSI), Department of the Army, who will be available about 8/24/62.

3.

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- (U) ~~(S)~~ 4. Major General CHARLES F. LEONARD, JR., ACSI, who will be available about 8/24/62.

- (U) ~~(S)~~ 5. PAUL H. NITZE, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), who will be available about 8/20/62.

- (U) ~~(S)~~ 6. Dr. GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman, Atomic

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Energy Commission, who will be available  
about 8/27/62.

- (U) ~~7~~. 7. Colonel [ ] Air Force Systems  
Command, who will be available about 8/20/62.

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This report is classified "~~Top~~ Secret" in order  
to protect the "~~Top~~ Secret" classification of National  
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62, which document and  
attendant documents similarly classified presented the  
bases for interviews in this investigation. ~~(S)~~

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COVER PAGE



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No. WFO 65-8755

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

August 18, 1962

ARTICLE BY HANSON W. BALDWIN IN  
"THE NEW YORK TIMES," JULY 26, 1962  
ESPIONAGE - X

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
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Information From Records of Jefferson Hotel,  
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Investigation

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SYNOPSIS

On July 26, 1962, the Attorney General requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct investigation to determine the source of a leak of classified information which was contained in an article by HANSON W. BALDWIN in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." The article is entitled "Russian Missiles Guarded by Concrete Installations" in one edition and in another edition of the same date, it is captioned "Soviet Missiles Protected in 'Hardened' Positions." Investigation determined that certain information contained in the article was referred to in a classified report known as National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8-62. Distribution of the advance copies of NIE 11-8-62 dated July 6, 1962, was initiated July 10, 1962. On the instructions of the President, these copies were recalled on the same date. Thirty eight copies of this same document were distributed on July 11, 1962, to top government officials. On July 17, 1962, distribution of 54 copies of the "all sources" or final NIE 11-8-62 document was made. ~~S-12-62~~

On July 30, 1962, HANSON W. BALDWIN was contacted at his residence, Chappaqua, New York, by Special Agents of the FBI. BALDWIN declined interview stating that he could be contacted at "The New York Times" on the following morning at 10:30 a.m. No further contact has been had with BALDWIN.

On July 30, 1962, [redacted] Washington Office. "The New York Times," was contacted at her residence. [redacted] stated that BALDWIN arrived in Washington, D. C., on July 16, 1962, and departed on July 19, 1962. On instructions from the New York Office of her employer, [redacted] made, or attempted to make, appointments for BALDWIN with JOHN A. MC CONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA; (FNU) ANDERSON, Department of Navy; ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and possibly with General L. L. LEMNITZER,

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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). She could not recall additional names but volunteered to check her office records to identify additional individuals.

On July 30, 1962, following the above contact with [redacted] (WF T-1) learned that she was in contact with (S) u WALLACE CARROLL of the Washington Office of "The New York Times." [redacted] advised CARROLL that she had been contacted by Special Agents of the FBI. CARROLL stated, "Don't give them any more."

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Subsequent to the contact with BALDWIN, WF T-2 learned on July 30, 1962, that JAMES L. RESTON of "The New York Times" in Washington, D. C., was in contact with BALDWIN. RESTON complained about the interview of [redacted] and BALDWIN complained about his contact with the FBI on that same evening. BALDWIN stated that "they" desired to identify his sources of information which he would not identify. BALDWIN commented that the real reason for these tactics was the President and "BOBBY" KENNEDY. BALDWIN stated he felt he had been discreet in everything regarding the military and had held back information for a long time. He stated he felt he knew what could be printed and what could not. (S) u

Investigation at the Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other agencies of the government indicated that BALDWIN is well known on the highest levels of the military and would consider it beneath his dignity to contact minor officials. The following persons who were in contact with BALDWIN during the period of July 16, 1962, through July 19, 1962, were identified and interviewed. All of these individuals denied furnishing any information (U) [From the NIE 11-8-62 document] to BALDWIN. (S) u

On July 16, 1962, BALDWIN checked in at the Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 2:02 p.m.

[redacted]

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On July 19, 1962, BALDWIN checked out of the Jefferson  
Hotel at 9:07 a.m.

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From 12:00 noon to about 1:20 p.m. on July 19, 1962, BALDWIN lunched with Brigadier General JAMES D. HITTLE, United States Marine Corps (Retired) and NORMAN S. PAUL, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, at the Army-Navy Club, Washington, D. C. They discussed various military battles; probable changes in the JCS and NATO commands and problems dealing with military personnel.

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Records of Northeast Airlines, Washington, D. C., reflect that H. W. BALDWIN departed from Washington National Airport at 8:00 p.m., July 19, 1962, on flight number 2728 en route to New York City.

On August 8, 1962, WF T-2 learned that BALDWIN was in contact with an individual believed to be ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, President and Publisher of "The New York Times." BALDWIN and DRYFOOS speculated at considerable length as to the reasons for the investigation of BALDWIN and commented on the investigation of other unrelated leaks of information. DRYFOOS during this contact indicated he was to receive a letter and a document which was to be delivered by the "Naval Attache." DRYFOOS referred to the President, in this connection, indicating he would make a response to his letter. (S) u

(U) ----- X

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Certain government officials interviewed felt that BALDWIN could have written his article by piecing together bits of information originating in material related to (U) NIE 11-8-62. Others felt BALDWIN must have seen various (U) classified documents relating to NIE 11-8-62 or been briefed by a person who had complete knowledge of the subject matter. Others felt BALDWIN could have been briefed by a person or persons who themselves had only participated in various briefings on the pertinent material. Several officials felt that the information used by BALDWIN was deliberately leaked to him by a knowledgeable, highly placed person.

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INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Attorney General on July 26, 1962, an investigation was instituted to determine the source of a leak of classified information contained in an article by HANSON W. BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962.

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INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
BNE	Board of National Estimates
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FNU	First Name Unknown
GMAIC	Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
ISA	International Security Affairs
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Agency
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NPIC	National Photographic Inter- pretation Center
(U) [NSA	National Security Agency <del>(S)</del>
NSC	National Security Council
OEP	Office of Emergency Planning
ONE	Office of National Estimates
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSI, CIA	Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

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SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAO	Special Activities Office
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIB	United States Intelligence Board
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WSEG	Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

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There is quoted below the article by HANSON W. BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962. This article was entitled "Soviet Missiles Protected In 'Hardened' Positions" in one edition, and was entitled "Russian Missiles Guarded By Concrete Installations" in another edition.

"Some Soviet ballistic missile sites are now being 'hardened'--protected by concrete--according to reliable reports reaching Washington. The hardening, so far, is not comparable to the underground silo type of launching tubes now being constructed in the United States for the Air Force's Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. It is comparable to the 'coffin-type' installations for some of this country's Atlas missiles.

"In these installations the missiles, until ready for launching, lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with, or slightly above, the surface of the ground. Before launching, the 'coffin' lid opens and the missiles are raised to a vertical position.

#### "How Data Are Gathered

"This type of construction provides some protection from the blast and heat of a nuclear explosion. But it is now considered minimum protection; the underground silo type of launching tube, lined with concrete and steel and capped by a heavy steel hatch, provides far greater protection from blast, heat and the earth shock of a near miss.

"Intelligence data on Soviet missiles, presumably gathered by electronic and communications intelligence and by satellite cameras and other devices, are considered quite reliable by Washington, although some details are, of course, missing.

"The new science of 'image interpretation,' which has replaced World War II's photo interpretation, includes the composite interpretation of photographs of all types, infrared and radar images, electronic emanations, radio evesdropping, and so on.

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"This science, plus some old-fashioned agent reports on such things as construction projects and car loadings, has yielded a pretty clear picture of Soviet missile development.

"There is confidence in Washington, as a result, that the United States today has both a quantitative and qualitative, or technological, lead vis-a-vis Soviet Russia in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"Number Estimated

"Soviet ICBMs, in operational readiness and in advanced stages of construction, apparently number considerably less than 100. Most of them stand in closely clustered, above-ground, open launching sites, where one large nuclear blast would knock out eight or more sites. The 'coffin' type of semi-hardened construction is just beginning.

"Some of the Soviet sites apparently have two missiles for each launcher. United States land-based missile sites have only one missile per launcher on the assumption that the sites would survive a nuclear interchange only long enough to launch a single missile.

"The United States has close to 100 land-based Atlas and Titan missiles ready in finished launching sites with 200 to be ready by the end of the year. About 1,200 ICBMs have been authorized or planned, including the solid-fueled Minuteman. The first Minuteman missiles will become operational this fall.

"The United States appears to be well ahead of Soviet Russia in the strength and diversity of its launching sites. The United States' missiles are believed to be more reliable and more accurate.

"In one respect the Soviet missiles have an advantage: They have greater thrust and can carry larger warheads. The current United States nuclear

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weapons tests in the Pacific have proved the development feasibility of a ten-megaton warhead for the Titan. This would have an explosive power equivalent to that of 10,000,000 tons of TNT, or almost twice the power of the United States largest missile warhead of today. The Russians, on the other hand, have the potential capability of mating 50-or-100 megaton warheads to their ICBMs.

"In fact, some experts believe that the Russians are deliberately building only a few of their huge, ponderous and expensive first-generation missiles, but are deliberately fitting the largest possible warheads to them in order to achieve maximum political and psychological effect and, in case of war, widespread damage and destruction by means of pattern bombardment.

#### "Missile Submarines

"In the development of nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines, there are indications that this country is technologically several years ahead of the Russians. The United States has nine Polaris submarines completed, a total of forty-one built, building or authorized. Russia's first submarines capable of launching missiles from submerged positions are just being built, and one of the first successful Soviet tests of a submerged missile launching was recently held.

"The advent of Russian missile-firing submarines and hardened land-based missile sites indicates to many in Washington that Soviet strategic thinking is roughly along the same lines as our own. Moscow, like Washington, is trying to make its nuclear deterrent and retaliatory power less and less vulnerable to surprise attack.

"As the invulnerability of missile launching sites increases and each side finds it impossible to knock out the other's nuclear capability by a surprise first strike, the stability of the deterrent is expected to increase, so that, in this respect at least, technological developments may help to ease world tension.

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"In the anti-ballistic missile field, Premier KHRUSHCHEV's boast about a rocket able 'to hit a fly in space' is taken with many grains of salt in Washington. Nevertheless, some Washington experts believe that the Soviet Union may be somewhat, though not much, ahead of the United States in this field.

"Some top Pentagon officials credit the Russians with the capability of intercepting a single Atlas, or perhaps a Titan, in flight. The United States Nike-Zeus system has just made its first successful intercept, over the Pacific, of an Atlas-type target missile. But neither Russia nor the United States, it is believed, has the capability of meeting a large-scale missile attack, or of intercepting missiles equipped with decoy devices or other penetration aids. The offense still appears to be well ahead of the defense.





"Many United States military officers are convinced that this country must demonstrate a greater sense of urgency in the anti-ballistic missile, and anti-satellite fields and in the military applications of space. Some of them anticipate uneasily another spectacular Soviet feat in space within the next few months. Some believe that this may take the form of shooting down a satellite."

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RMW/pcn

The following biographic and descriptive information concerning HANSON BALDWIN was obtained from the records of the Accreditation and Travel Section, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and from the 1962-1963 edition of "Who's Who In America".

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Name: HANSON ~~WEIGHTMAN~~ BALDWIN  
Birth date: Born March 22, 1903, at  
Baltimore, Maryland  
Sex: Male  
Race: White  
Height: 6'2"  
Weight: 170 pounds  
Hair: Grey-brown  
Eyes: Grey-green  
Build: Slender  
Marital status: Married  
Wife:   
Children:   
Parents:   
Father - OLIVER P. BALDWIN  
deceased  
Mother - CAROLINE F. BALDWIN  
deceased  
Sister:   
Parents-in-law: ELIZABETH BALDWIN (deceased)  
WILLIAM BRUCE (deceased)  
Mrs. WILLIAM BRUCE  
905 East High Street  
Springfield, Ohio  
Address: Morton Place  
Chappaqua, New York

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**Education:**

U. S. Naval Academy  
Class of 1924

**Military service:**

U. S. Navy, 1920 - 1927;  
Resigned 1927 with rank  
of Lieutenant (jg)

**Employment:**

1928-1929  
Reporter, "Baltimore Sun"  
Baltimore, Maryland  
1929 to date  
"The New York Times"  
New York City

**Organizations:**

U. S. Naval Institute  
Annapolis, Maryland  
National Press Club  
Washington, D. C.  
U. S. Military Institute  
Washington, D. C.  
Society of American Historians  
Princeton, New Jersey  
Silurians (press organization)  
New York City

U. S. Naval Academy Alumni  
Association, Annapolis,  
Maryland

Eberstadt Task Force on the  
National Security  
Washington, D. C.  
(1948-1949)

Organization of the Hoover  
Commission, Washington, D. C.  
(1948-1949)

Pulitzer Prize 1942

**Author:**

Men and Ships of Steel, 1935  
(with W. F. PALMER)

The Caissons Roll - A Military  
Survey of Europe, 1938

Admiral Death, 1939

What the Citizen Should Know  
About the Navy, 1941

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WFO 65-8755

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Author:  
(Cont'd)

*United We Stand, 1941*  
*Strategy for Victory, 1942*  
*The Price of Power, 1948*  
*Great Mistakes of the War,*  
*1950*  
*Sea Fights and Shipwrecks,*  
*1955*  
*The Great Arms Race, 1958*

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[redacted] Bureau of Personnel, United States Navy, made available on August 2, 1962, the 1962 edition of the "Register of Alumni" published by the United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, Incorporated, Annapolis, Maryland, which reflects that of the 523 graduates of the Naval Academy Class of 1924, nine officers are presently on active Naval duty. A review of the records of the Officer Locator, Bureau of Personnel, by [redacted] confirmed the active duty status of the following officers:

BERNARD LIGE AUSTIN, Vice Admiral, date of birth December 15, 1902, in South Carolina, presently serving as Commandant, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

WALLACE MORRIS BEAKLEY, Vice Admiral, date of birth January 20, 1903, in New Jersey, presently assigned to the Atlantic Fleet Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia

ROBERT LORD CAMPBELL, JR., Rear Admiral, date of birth September 12, 1903, in Michigan, presently serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, U. S. Naval Command, APO 128, New York, New York (Europe)

CLARENCE EUGENE EKSTROM, Vice Admiral, date of birth February 10, 1902, in Wisconsin, presently assigned as Commander, Naval Air Pacific, Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, California.

ROBERT (no middle initial) GOLDTHWAITE, Vice Admiral, date of birth September 20, 1903, in Alabama, presently assigned as Commander, Western Sea Frontier, and Commander Pacific Reserve Fleet, Treasure Island, San Francisco, California.

RUFUS EDWARD ROSE, JR., Rear Admiral, date of birth July 10, 1903, in Florida, presently assigned as Commandant, Industrial College of Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C.

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~~HAROLD PAGE SMITH~~, Vice Admiral, date of birth February 11, 1904, in Alabama, assigned as Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, EPO 100, New York, New York. X

~~GEORGE CROSBY TOWNER~~, Rear Admiral, date of birth March 19, 1901, in Montana, presently assigned as Commandant, 13th Naval District, Seattle, Washington.

~~ELMER EUGENE YEOMANS~~, Rear Admiral, date of birth May 17, 1902, in Indiana, assigned as Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Japan, EPO, San Francisco, California. Admiral YEOMANS will be assigned as of October, 1962, as Commandant, 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California.

The "Register of Alumni", previously described, also lists with the Naval Academy graduating class of 1924 HANSON WEIGHTMAN BALDWIN, date of birth March 22, 1903, in Maryland. BALDWIN's present employment was noted as "The New York Times", 229 West 43rd Street, New York 36, New York, and his residence as 39 Morton Place, Chappaqua, New York. BALDWIN's Naval service was listed as being terminated November 5, 1927, when he resigned holding the rank of Lieutenant.

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HANSON W. BALDWIN  
39 MORTON PLACE  
CHAPPAQUA, NEW YORK

On July 30, 1962, at 6:58 p.m., HANSON W. BALDWIN was approached at his home for the purpose of interviewing him in connection with an article containing his by-line which appeared in "The New York Times" of July 26, 1962. Mr. BALDWIN came to the door and when the Agents identified themselves, he told them that he had just arrived home, was about to have his dinner and could not receive them at that time.

He was asked if the Agents could interview him following his dinner. BALDWIN said no and told the Agents that he resented "this kind of approach"; was at his office all day and thought they should have the courtesy to have made an appointment with him. He declined to be interviewed at that time, but suggested that he would be available at his office on the following day at 10:30 a.m.

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WFO 65-8755  
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[REDACTED] WASHINGTON OFFICE

"THE NEW YORK TIMES"  
2700 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N. W.

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[REDACTED] Washington Office,

"The New York Times", residence [REDACTED] was interviewed from 6:45 p.m. till 7:20 p.m., July 30, 1962. She stated that BALDWIN arrived in Washington, D.C., on Monday, July 16 and remained until the evening of Thursday, July 19, 1962. The first information she had regarding his visit was on the Thursday preceding his arrival, at which time the [REDACTED] of BALDWIN in New York City, [REDACTED] called from New York requesting that she make appointments with nine individuals in Washington, D.C. She was to advise these individuals that the purpose of BALDWIN's contacts was with regard to current defense matters. BALDWIN stayed at the Jefferson Hotel, Washington, D.C., where he normally stays, during his current visit. She believed BALDWIN arrived in Washington sometime around noon on July 16, 1962. No appointments for him on that date were known to [REDACTED]. She attempted either prior to the arrival of BALDWIN or following his arrival to arrange appointments with the following individuals: Mr. JOHN A. MC CONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Mr. ROBERT S. MC NAMARA, Secretary of Defense; Mr. (FNU) ANDERSON, Navy; and Mr. ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK, Deputy Secretary of Defense. She felt that possibly an appointment was made with General L. L. LEMNITZER, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. [REDACTED] could not recall the identities of other individuals with whom she made appointments for BALDWIN. She recalled, however, that she had contacted the following persons in order to set up appointments: Lieutenant [REDACTED] (Phonetic), Navy; Commander [REDACTED] Navy; Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] Army, or someone in [REDACTED] office; [REDACTED] office of ARTHUR SYLVESTER, Assistant Secretary of Defense, for the appointment with Mr. MC NAMARA.

Through past experience, [REDACTED] stated that with the exception of CIA, generally all appointments for BALDWIN are made with individuals at the Pentagon. She stated that an appointment at the State Department would be an exception and could recall only one instance when an attempt was made for an appointment, which was not during the most

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recent BALDWIN visit. This attempt was unsuccessful since the person, name unrecalled, was out of the country.

                     stated that BALDWIN had "a couple" of luncheon dates while visiting Washington, D. C.; however, she did not know with whom he met nor the dates. She believed these engagements were set up by                      from New York.

She stated BALDWIN deals mainly with persons of Secretary stature but felt that he must have "back door" contacts. She stated his visits to Washington, D. C., were at three or four month intervals and the pattern of appointments is the same for each visit. She has never made appointments for BALDWIN with press information officers at any Government agency. She stated that she had not seen the article in question at the time of publication but, from a cursory perusal, felt that he possibly could have gotten the data from a "back door" contact. She stated no one else in Washington, D. C., to her knowledge, makes appointments for BALDWIN other than herself. She pointed out that she did not have personal contact with BALDWIN on his most recent visit, however, she did converse with him several times by telephone.

                     was requested to furnish the identities of any contacts BALDWIN has in Washington, D. C., below the Secretary and general officer level. She stated that she knew of none. When furnishing from memory the above appointments made by her, she related that she kept in her office an exact list of appointments made for BALDWIN on each visit. She stated she would make this list available to the FBI. Upon further reflection, she felt that she should advise her superiors that she had been interviewed and that she had offered to make the material available.                      was advised that there would be no objection to this. She observed that JACK RAYMOND has the Pentagon beat for "The New York Times" but that ordinarily he handles matters of a different nature than those handled by BALDWIN.

                     also recalled that BALDWIN indicated his daughter in New York City was seriously ill and that he was greatly concerned with her welfare. BALDWIN contacted his home probably on Wednesday, July 18, 1962, to determine the

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WFO 65-8755

condition of her health and was reassured that some improvement had been noted. Accordingly, BALDWIN decided to remain in Washington an additional day.

[redacted] has not contacted the Washington Field Office to furnish the identities of additional individuals with whom she attempted to make appointments for BALDWIN, and no efforts have been made to contact [redacted] since the above occasion.

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<sup>8u</sup>  
[WF T-1] learned that on the evening of July 30, 1962, [redacted] Washington, D. C. Office of "The New York Times," contacted WALLACE CARROLL of the Washington Office of "The New York Times." [redacted] advised CARROLL that she had a visit from two FBI men. She advised CARROLL that the FBI was trying to determine who furnished BALDWIN the information for his column and that "apparently the Attorney General took exception to one of his columns." She also told CARROLL that she had informed the FBI about some of BALDWIN's appointments made by her. CARROLL, according to the informant, told [redacted] "Don't give them any more." CARROLL also advised [redacted] to do nothing more until July 31, 1962, and indicated that he might call the Attorney General.

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RCB:mdc

On the evening of July 30, 1962, WF T-2 learned that JAMES B. RESTON of the Washington Office of "The New York Times" was in contact with HANSON W. BALDWIN. They each indicated they were "mad" about the interviews with [redacted] Washington Office of "The New York Times" and BALDWIN in New York City. RESTON pointed out that [redacted] had been contacted at her home by an FBI man who had properly identified himself and who had asked whom BALDWIN had seen in Washington, D. C. BALDWIN stated that two FBI men had called at his home during the evening of July 30 and he had refused to see them saying that he would see them at his office. RESTON remarked that it was an "outrage and we ought to print the whole thing." BALDWIN agreed and suggested that RESTON tell "ORVILLE" (possibly ORVILLE E. DRYFOOS, the publisher of "The New York Times") (S) u

BALDWIN remarked, "This is going very far in this administration. I think it is extremely dangerous." RESTON replied, "There is a strange feeling in Congress that a dossier is being kept on all these people. Probably a great deal comes out of their imagination and guilty conscience but there is this suspicion that this kind of tactic is being used." BALDWIN agreed that "this" is a new and different tactic "similar to what happened with reporters in the middle of the night at the time of the steel price rise." BALDWIN also said, "I think the real answer to this is BOBBY KENNEDY and the President himself, but BOBBY KENNEDY particularly putting pressure on HOOVER." (S) u

BALDWIN said that the "Iron Curtain around the Pentagon" is just as pronounced as in other places and he stated that he had always been most discreet about the military in protecting sources. He also pointed out that he had held back on certain things "as in the August project and then they went ahead and printed it. I resent this kind of pressure." RESTON commented at this point, "I resent that these guys had enough guts to come knock on your door, but what is really sneaky is calling up a poor. . ." BALDWIN interrupted at this point to say he hoped RESTON had apologized to her (apparently [redacted] for him, and then said, "She simply told them that I saw everybody, didn't she?" RESTON said that was correct. (S) u

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WFO 65-8755

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RESTON commented, "When they begin to do this thing in Washington, it becomes a question of whether we are going to report the news or not." BALDWIN pointed out, "When I reported that KENNEDY ordered the FBI into the Pentagon before the Berlin crisis, KENNEDY became angry, and then there was a story [redacted] wrote in 'Newsweek' about various solutions for the Berlin crisis and KENNEDY blew his top. They actually went to [redacted] and did some of these crummy intimidating tactics." (In this instance BALDWIN probably was referring to an investigation conducted in 1961 in the matter entitled, "Unknown Subject; Leak of Classified Information Appearing in the July 3, 1961, 'Newsweek' Magazine Article Captioned 'Pentagon Plan.'" *JS* u b6 b7C

RESTON told BALDWIN, "All it takes to deal with KENNEDY who essentially is a politician and not a cop is for us to print the news. This is more damaging to him than the information he would gain by talking to everybody you saw." RESTON also commented, "If we print a story of what's going on down here, I don't propose to take it up as a policy matter. I propose, if you agree, after we know what more is back of all this, merely to file a story, then if they want to take the responsibility of killing it, we'll know where we are." *JS* u

WF T-2 learned that on the evening of August 8, 1962, HANSON W. BALDWIN was contacted by a person believed to be ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, President and Publisher of "The New York Times." DRYFOOS advised BALDWIN that "they" received "the FBI part of it" (possibly referring to our investigation in this matter) and DRYFOOS expected to receive a personal letter from the President together with "a document telling the who, the what, the why, evidently the background" although "this man hasn't called for an appointment." DRYFOOS did not know when the man was "coming up" although the man's secretary had called and DRYFOOS had called back. (Later DRYFOOS indicated to BALDWIN "the Naval Attache" would deliver the document.) *JS* u

BALDWIN inquired of DRYFOOS, "You saw the UP story today? Well, DREW PEARSON had something in his column" (inaudible). "Apparently they queried ARTHUR SYLVESTER in the Pentagon on it." *JS* u

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There was a UP story as a result. It simply said that ARTHUR SYLVESTER had no comment on this. They brought in also [redacted] of the Washington 'Star.' The PEARSON story said in effect the FBI was following, gumshoeing after reporters and so on. And then it went on to mention specifically the Military Editor of 'The New York Times' without specifying the story. ~~S~~ U

When DRYFOOS asked if that was what PEARSON had said BALDWIN answered, "That's what PEARSON said and ARTHUR SYLVESTER was asked about this by the President. And he said he had no comment on whether or not the FBI was looking into any story written by me but he denied that MC NAMARA" (probably Secretary of Defense ROBERT S. MC NAMARA) "had ever ordered the FBI to follow or investigate any newspaperman and then he further said--this is amusing, it indicates the state of mind of the reporters in the Pentagon--he said he denied that the press room telephones in the Pentagon were tapped. Then he went on to mention [redacted]--he's the Washington 'Evening Star'. [redacted] some weeks ago had an exclusive story which he had discussed with Mr. MC NAMARA. I had heard this before from [redacted] And Mr. MC NAMARA apparently had told him not to use it. He didn't use it. Mr. MC NAMARA then went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and" (inaudible) "them to find out where [redacted] had gotten it. Of course it irked [redacted] quite a lot. And Sylvester mentioned this" (inaudible) "That was the gist of the story. ~~S~~ U

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"I would like to point out that the President has done this same thing before. He sent General TAYLOR to see Mr. LUCE, HARRY LUCE, after the Cuban invasion and complaining about the story that 'Fortune' magazine carried by [redacted] The President denounced this story at a press conference and very unwisely, I think, sent General TAYLOR to see Mr. LUCE. And Mr. LUCE did have [redacted] and also [redacted] the [redacted] of 'Fortune,' in at the time TAYLOR came and TAYLOR made some nine" (inaudible) "specifications of what he alleged were errors. And both [redacted] refuted ~~S~~ U

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them. At least that's the story I get. TAYLOR at the end said let's forget it. He was ordered to do the job. I don't think TAYLOR would have undertaken this unless he was ordered. Mr. LUCE was alleged to have said that we won't forget it because the President called us a liar in public or words to that effect. But this sort of thing has been done before. I think the great danger here, ORV, and I think it's something you're very conscious of because we talked about it the other day, because the President may attempt to tie your hands completely, not only for now but for the future. And I think this can be a great danger. So I think that all you can do is play it by ear. (S) u

DRYFOOS advised BALDWIN that "they have a complete report on the incident" indicating "what the facts are." BALDWIN then asked, "They don't allege to have said who said what to me?" In reply DRYFOOS advised, "I haven't seen it, I don't know. That's the kind of thing that after I see, I won't be able to discuss afterward." BALDWIN said, "The point of the thing that I think you ought better be wary of, because I think this involves the paper. It seems to me that is the sort of thing that you shouldn't let yourself be tied up on, if I just may offer that suggestion. I think that if it's a question of secret sources, I mean by that information we may be getting from Russia, or ways of getting it, that's another thing altogether." (S) u

DRYFOOS commented that he could not be "bound" by the document and he would not be able to discuss it. He also said that if it was a personal document from the President he would look at it and give it back to "the Naval Attache." BALDWIN commented that he understood. BALDWIN also stated that "you have to be pretty careful what you say to the Naval Attache and to the President afterwards." BALDWIN also commented, "We're all on the same team. What I mean is that we're all as interested in America as he is or is anyone else." When DRYFOOS stated he would take the responsibility BALDWIN indicated he did not want DRYFOOS to do so and he would be "glad" to share the responsibility with him. (S) u

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WFO 65-8755

BALDWIN inquired if DRYFOOS had received "that letter I sent you from the young chap in the National Guard Bureau. Because this is the sort of thing that I think is deplorable. The Administration is going to suffer for this because you cannot win loyalty that way." DRYFOOS indicated he had to "stick with this particular episode." (By "the young chap" BALDWIN was possibly referring to Major JAMES C. ELLIOTT, Deputy Chief, Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, Department of the Army, mentioned elsewhere in this report. *SH*)

DRYFOOS and BALDWIN agreed they were "talking blind" and DRYFOOS commented, "Maybe I can talk less blind after I get this thing." BALDWIN then remarked, "Well, it seems clear that when the President brings up a subject like this, you obviously have to acknowledge it and be polite. There is another point of view to it that the methods employed can never be forgotten and I think this is vital for a free press. And it's vital for any sense of loyalty for the people who are wearing the uniform. This has happened twice now in the Pentagon. It's created a terrific amount of distress. And it naturally would." *SH*

BALDWIN also told DRYFOOS that if "they can spell this out at all you can say that you know nothing of what the source is." To which DRYFOOS commented, "Well, that's why I'm delighted I don't." BALDWIN replied, "And you must so report and this is a safeguard of the press and it always has been. That you don't intend to violate it. I think you have to make that point." *SH*

BALDWIN stated, "I would like to get at the background of this. I didn't see SCOTTY" (probably JAMES RESTON of the Washington, D. C., office of "The New York Times") "I wish I had seen him personally, but when SCOTTY talked to you, apparently he gave you the impression before. I don't know whether he did this time. One of the chief worries of the Administration was the fact that the right hand didn't know what the left hand was doing." DRYFOOS pointed out that BALDWIN's statement was correct and "there is no question about it." To which BALDWIN replied, "Well then, if this is true, then it seems to me this" *SH*

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WFO 65-8755

is something you had better take up very strongly." DRYFOOS stated, "That goes beyond this episode. I'm involving myself in a governmental function and this is a game I don't want to play." (S) u

BALDWIN replied, "Well, perhaps not but on the other hand I think you want to make the strong point that the press can't be bound by the fact the Government is embarrassed. After all, you're talking to a Naval Attache here. I don't think you have to say anything to him and I wouldn't." When DRYFOOS pointed out that the "Naval Attache" was acting as a messenger BALDWIN said, "I know, but he's bringing a letter, and I personally think your letter ought to be back to the President after he's left. The less you say to the Naval Attache, the better. That's my feeling. I don't know." (S) u

BALDWIN expressed his sorrow for giving DRYFOOS "bad dreams" but DRYFOOS stated that "if there was a violation it's their violation." BALDWIN doubted this and said he thought that "they may be making a big show about how wrong the 'Times' was." DRYFOOS did not "think they'll be saying anything to anybody on the outside" and BALDWIN indicated he did not mean "on the outside" but rather "in the letter to you." When DRYFOOS pronounced, "We're only wrong if they're wrong too," BALDWIN stated, "I don't think we're wrong either. I don't see that the 'Times' has any great responsibility for this. I think that they are really trying to put the blame where it doesn't belong. This isn't the first time. And it's pretty notorious around the Pentagon especially on the working press. I think that all the sympathy probably would be on our side of the fence. The fact they were so chary about having anything in print indicates this." (S) u

In addition to the above, WF T-2 learned that on August 9, 1962, BALDWIN contacted his wife during the late afternoon and stated that there was "no sweat" and everything would be all right. (S) u

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NY 65-16201  
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STAFF SERGEANT [REDACTED]  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES  
663 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

On July 30, 1962, Sergeant [REDACTED] advised that in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED] who were unavailable, he received a telephone call from [REDACTED] Staff Researcher for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York Times."

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[REDACTED] read the following statement to [REDACTED]  
"In these installations, missiles, not yet ready for launching, lie horizontally in a large concrete box flush with or slightly above. Is this true?"

[REDACTED] stated that he answered the question in the affirmative. In reading this excerpt, it was [REDACTED] impression that [REDACTED] was referring to American missile sites in that he gave [REDACTED] no indication to the contrary.

[REDACTED] stated that shortly after this conversation, he advised his superiors, Colonel [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED]

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[redacted]  
On August 4, 1962, [redacted] was interviewed at  
5:00 p.m. at his summer cottage at [redacted]  
[redacted] He said he has been [redacted]  
[redacted] for the last twenty years.

He said he did not know HANSON W. BALDWIN's sources with respect to the column written by BALDWIN which appeared on the first page of "The New York Times" on July 26, 1962. He said in response to the question, "Do you in fact know the sources but decline to furnish them?" that historically a newspaperman protects his sources of information. Again pressed for an answer to the question quoted, [redacted] said he would decline to answer the question.

He declined to identify anyone whom he knew who might know BALDWIN's sources.

He said that he had set up some appointments for BALDWIN prior to BALDWIN's trip to Washington, D. C., on July 16, 1962. Some were made directly with the person involved, others indirectly through others. He declined to identify those with whom appointments were made directly or otherwise.

He stated that BALDWIN was not called to Washington, D. C., prior to his trip there, and he received no special call to come to develop the story which appeared on July 26, 1962, over BALDWIN's name. He declined to say whether any portion of the article was prepared before or after BALDWIN's visit to Washington.

He declined to say when it was written.

He said that to appear in the paper on July 26, 1962, it would have to be ready by 8:30 p.m. on July 25, 1962, and perhaps earlier.

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[ ] said he did not write the article or any portion of it. BALDWIN writes all his own material.

When [ ] writes, he writes in his own name.

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He did say he did some editing of the article. In reading the article to refresh his recollection, [ ] stated that it was all public knowledge and considers this type article a real public service.

[ ] In reading over paragraph four of the article commented: "That's very carefully worded--very general."

He was asked whether he knew if any portion of the material contained classified information. He said he did not.

He said BALDWIN and he had no discussion concerning the article as to care in its preparation due to the nature of the material in it, nor was there any suggestion by BALDWIN that it might contain classified information. He said there were no questions about it by any other member of the "Times" staff.

He was asked if in all instances he is equally knowledgeable with BALDWIN as to the sources, background and development of a story such as the one in question. He said not necessarily.

He said he had not been in touch with BALDWIN since the article appeared, and he had not contacted BALDWIN.

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NY 65-16201  
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED]  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES  
663 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

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Colonel [REDACTED] advised on July 30, 1962, that one of the primary functions of the Office of Information Services is to provide United States Air Force Information to communications media.

On July 24 or 25, 1962, Staff Sergeant [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he received a telephone call from [REDACTED] for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York Times." [REDACTED] inquiry concerned accuracy of a phrase pertaining to the semi-hardened or hardened state of missile emplacements. According to [REDACTED] answered [REDACTED] that the excerpt from a proposed story was accurate and the conversation was terminated.

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[REDACTED] stated that it was [REDACTED] impression that [REDACTED] inquiry referred to the United States missile sites, although [REDACTED] had not specified when talking with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] added that it is the usual practice when an inquiry comes into his office that the inquiry is usually handled by himself or Captain [REDACTED] United States Air Force, but neither he nor Captain [REDACTED] was available when [REDACTED] called.

[REDACTED] added that when [REDACTED] advised him of [REDACTED] call, it surprised him that [REDACTED] had made such an inquiry in that [REDACTED] thought that [REDACTED] should have known the military terminology concerning missile emplacements.

[REDACTED] also advised that all the information which the Office of Information Services has at its

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disposal for dissemination to the communications media .  
is of an unclassified nature.

[ ] also stated that [ ] was acting  
in line with his official duties in replying to [ ]  
inquiry.

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NY 65-16201  
WFO 65-8755  
JFR:bjn

CAPTAIN [REDACTED]  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES  
663 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

On July 30, 1962, Captain [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] for HANSON W. BALDWIN, Military Editor of "The New York Times" was a frequent caller at this office requesting Air Force information and that this information is provided, if available to the office.

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Captain [REDACTED] confirmed the information provided by Colonel [REDACTED] but could add no further information concerning [REDACTED] inquiry.

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Investigation has identified the following contacts of HANSON W. BALDWIN at the time and dates indicated during his visit to Washington, D. C., July 16, 1962, through July 19, 1962.

<u>Monday</u> <u>July 16, 1962</u>	<u>Tuesday</u> <u>July 17, 1962</u>	<u>Wednesday</u> <u>July 18, 1962</u>	<u>Thursday</u> <u>July 19, 1962</u>
2:02 p.m., checked in at Jefferson Hotel	10:00 a.m. - 2:15 or 3:30 p.m., Army- Navy Club with Admirals WRIGHT, FITZGERALD, FLUCKEY, DYER Capt. [REDACTED]	9:15 a.m. - 12:00 noon Military Library [REDACTED] 12:30 p.m. - 1:45 p.m. lunch at Sheraton- Carlton Hotel with Admirals JERAULD WRIGHT and W. R. SMEDBERG	9:07 a.m. BALDWIN checked out of Jefferson Hotel 9:40 a.m. - 10:05 a.m. Lt. Genl. WILLIAM P. ENNIS
3:01 p.m. - 3:42 p.m. Secretary of Navy KORTH, Pentagon	3:30 p.m. - 4:15 p.m. Deputy Secy. of Defense ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC	3:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Rear Admiral THOMAS H. MOORER	10:50 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Vice Admiral R. B. PIRIE
3:45 p.m. - 4:17 p.m. Vice Admiral CLAUDE V. RICKETTS	4:45 p.m. 5:25 p.m. Brig. Genl. JERRY D. PAGE USAF	4:30 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. Vice Admiral WILLIAM F. RABORN	12:00 p.m. - 1:20 p.m. lunch at Army-Navy Club with Brig. Gen. J. D. HITTLE (ret.) and Asst. Secy. Defense NORMAN S. PAUL
4:30 p.m. - 4:40 p.m. Major General C. G. DODGE, Pentagon		6:30 p.m. - 7:05 p.m. Lt. Gen. DAVID A. BURCHINAL at Jefferson Hotel	2:30 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. Admiral GEORGE W. ANDERSON 3:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m. Gen. BARKSDALE HAMLETT

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Monday  
July 16, 1962

Tuesday  
July 17, 1962

Wednesday  
July 18, 1962

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Thursday  
July 19, 1962

7:05 p.m. -  
10:00 p.m. -  
Major and  
Mrs. JAMES  
C. ELLIOTT -  
dinner

5:00 p.m.  
Secy. of  
Defense  
ROBERT S.  
MC NAMARA

6:00 p.m.  
General  
LYMAN  
LEMNITZER

8:00 p.m.  
departed  
Washington,  
D.C., via  
Northeast  
Airlines  
en route  
New York City

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[REDACTED]  
HOTEL JEFFERSON  
1200 16th STREET, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

On July 30, 1962, [REDACTED] advised, from records of the Hotel Jefferson, that HANSON W. BALDWIN registered at 2:02 p.m., July 16, 1962, and checked out at 9:07 a.m., July 19, 1962. While at the hotel, BALDWIN was charged for five long-distance telephone calls and fourteen local telephone calls. According to [REDACTED] the numbers to which local telephone calls are made are not recorded.

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The long-distance calls made by BALDWIN were recorded as follows:

July 17, 1962	Chappaqua, New York CE 8-3781
	New York City CI 5-9388
	New York City TE 8-2710
	Chappaqua, New York CE 8-3481
July 18, 1962	New York City CI 5-9388

With regard to the above telephone numbers, investigation in the New York City area has established the following:

New York telephone number CI 5-9388 is a semi-coin box telephone at the Roosevelt Hospital, 9th Avenue and 59th Street, New York City.

New York telephone number TE 8-2710 is listed to the offices of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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CE 8-3781 is the telephone number of HANSON W. BALDWIN at his residence in Chappaqua, New York.

CE 8-3481 is listed to [REDACTED]

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With regard to the calls to CI 5-9388 and TE 8-2710, it is noted that WFT-2 advised on August 1, 1962, that [REDACTED] was hospitalized with a broken pelvis. (S) u

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MISCELLANEOUS INTERVIEWS

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RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.  
PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR  
DEFENSE ANALYSIS

On August 1, 1962, Mr. BISSELL was interviewed at his office, Fifth Floor, 1710 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C.

Mr. BISSELL advised that he had read the article by BALDWIN which appeared in the July 26, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." He stated that he knows BALDWIN but does not consider him to be an acquaintance. He said that he met BALDWIN perhaps a year or two ago, but cannot recall having seen or talked to him since that time except that on July 27, 1962, BALDWIN called him from New York with reference to an article BALDWIN was preparing for subsequent release, and which article appeared under BALDWIN's by-line in the July 28, 1962, issue of "The New York Times." BISSELL said that the article was with reference to a controversy between the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to BISSELL, BALDWIN, in this article, quoted BISSELL with his, BISSELL's, permission. He advised that he has no recollection that he has had any other conversation with BALDWIN in recent months. He advised that he had no information as to the identity of BALDWIN's contacts although, in BISSELL's opinion, BALDWIN obviously has many contacts among officials in the Pentagon. The only contact at the Pentagon he has heard of is that during the week that the above article was published, he, BISSELL, was told that BALDWIN saw Lieutenant General WILLIAM P. ENNIS in connection with the above article, but that ENNIS refused to discuss the position of the WSEG on the matter. He stated it was his definite impression that BALDWIN had sought out ENNIS and he, BISSELL, has no information that BALDWIN was acquainted with ENNIS.

BISSELL stated that the only representative of "The New York Times" known to him is JAMES RESTON, whom he recalls meeting, probably at a social function, possibly during January, 1962. He stated he never discussed any classified matter with RESTON.

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- (U) ~~✓~~ BISSELL stated he did not see the final draft of ~~✓~~ NIE 11-8-62 and has no recollection of seeing any of the ~~✓~~ analytical papers which preceded the final draft. In fact, ~~✓~~ BISSELL stated he has not seen any NIE papers for the past ~~✓~~ four or five months. ~~✓~~

- (U) BISSELL stated that from his review of the article he could not see that its publication would further the interests of any particular branch of the service or any other Government Agency. He indicated that, in his opinion, the tone of the article suggested loose talk by someone familiar with fairly recent intelligence, both substantive content as well as recent acquisition. He further stated that, in his opinion, the information could have come from someone knowledgeable in the field and not necessarily from ~~✓~~ someone who had access to or had read NIE 11-8-62. ~~✓~~

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CONTENT OF SPEECH BY SECRETARY  
OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. MCNAMARA  
DELIVERED AT ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN  
JUNE 16, 1962

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In view of BALDWIN's expressed interest in the commencement address made by Secretary of Defense MC NAMARA on June 16, 1962, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and because of the comments of Mr. ORVILLE SPLITT, Director of News Services, that Pentagon correspondents believed the address indicated a breakthrough in intelligence, the commencement address is set forth as follows:

"I am glad to be home, and I am particularly glad to be here for a university occasion. For this University gives meaning and focus to life in Ann Arbor -- even for those who are not privileged to be associated with it directly -- as the academic community serves to clarify the objectives and focus the energies of the Free World.

"President KENNEDY aptly described the function of the university when he said: 'The pursuit of knowledge ... rests ... on the idea of a world based on diversity, self-determination, and freedom. And that is the kind of world to which we Americans, as a nation, are committed by the principles upon which the great Republic was founded. As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they create a world which freely unites national diversity and international partnership.'

"Commencement orators like to point to the fact that what we celebrate here is not an end, but a beginning. I prefer to take my text from another aspect of the occasion which we are observing today.

"The ancient formula for the award of academic degrees admits you into a long-established community, whether it be the fellowship of educated men, or the ancient and honorable company of scholars, of which you are the newest members. This community embodies the highest ideals of the Free World. Its membership includes people of every race, color, and creed. They share a common language, the language of ideas. They are dedicated to the fullest possible development of the individual human potential. And the only requirement for admission is a demonstrated capacity for and commitment to the

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use of one's powers of reason.

"What I want to talk to you about here today are some of the concrete problems of maintaining a free community in the world today. I want to talk to you particularly about the problems of the community that bind together the United States and the countries of Western Europe.

"Europe is the source of many of our traditions. One of these is the tradition of the university, which we can trace back to the groves of Academe, on the same site where only a few weeks ago the foreign ministers and ministers of defense of the European nations and the United States met to discuss their common problems.

"I need scarcely remind you that Europe is one of the great sources of the American idea of freedom, and that it was the European philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who shaped the thinking of our own founding fathers. For all of us, Europe has been our teacher since we first learned to read.

"One of the most impressive lessons that Europe has provided us recently is the lesson of her revival from the ashes of destruction at the end of the Second World War. The national economies of Europe were almost at standstill 15 years ago. Their capital plant was largely destroyed, either directly by bombing, or indirectly by years of neglect and patchwork repair. The people were exhausted by six years of war, and a large part of the most productive age group had been wiped out. Yet in the last 10 years, they have managed to increase the production of steel and electricity by over 130 percent each, and this has been typical of the recovery pattern.

"The pump-priming help of the American Marshall Plan came at a crucial time in the process of European recovery. But the genius of the plan as envisaged by men like GEORGE MARSHALL and HARRY TRUMAN, was to help the Europeans help themselves.

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"At the same time that the nations of Europe were rebuilding at home, they were going through the difficult and often painful process of re-establishing their relationships with the peoples of Africa and Asia, no longer as a master and servant, but as members of the human race, all equally entitled to develop their individual capabilities. This process of change is by no means complete, and there are still difficult times ahead. But the joint achievement of Europe and its former colonies in revising their relations with each other is at least as impressive as the economic recovery of Europe itself.

"What may be the greatest post-war European achievement is still in the making. The nations of Europe have begun to level the outmoded barriers that confined their individual economies within national boundaries. As JEAN MONNET, the principal architect of the new Europe puts it,

"'An entirely new situation has been created in the world, simply by adding six countries together. It's not an addition; in fact, it's a multiplication. You multiply the capabilities of the countries you unite. A dynamic process is beginning that is changing the face of Europe and the role of Europeans in the world.'

"The making of Europe has only begun, and indeed it is perhaps at its most critical stage. But we should not overlook the fact that French coal and German steel now move freely across the continent, and that German refrigerators and Italian shoes are being sold increasingly without restriction in Belgian department stores.

"All of these achievements have been accomplished under pressure from titanic forces which make a rational organization of human society increasingly difficult both for the Europeans and for ourselves. Let me mention some of these forces.

"We are confronted with a population explosion resulting from our own success in coping with disease

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and abnormalities, and by now threatening to double the earth's population by the end of this century. Unless we can control this explosion in the poor and resource-limited countries, the effects of economic growth may be cancelled out by population growth, and unsatisfied rising expectations, particularly in the younger nations, may upset the delicate balance of political stability.

"We are borne along by the accelerating pace of science and technology. In this country alone, new inventions are patented at a rate of 50,000 a year. Our population of scientists and engineers has increased by more than 40 percent in the last eight years. In fact, 80 per cent of all scientists and engineers who have lived throughout history are alive today.

"We are faced with an extraordinary increase in the number of national states. Since World War II, 35 new nations have been formed. Each new nation expresses the natural desire for self-determination and self-government. But their numbers complicate the problem of international diplomacy at the same time that military and economic developments increase our interdependence. Every nation is more and more directly affected by the internal situation of its neighbors, and the globe has shrunk to the point where we are all each other's neighbors.

"Lastly, we live in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet drive for world domination--surely not the only shadow on the world today, but one of the longest and deepest. By itself it represents the most serious military force this nation has ever faced; by its exploitation of the entire world's troubles, it is a threat of a kind that is as new to the world as the rising technologies and populations and national sovereignties themselves.

"In the face of all these challenges, the ultimate objective of the free world is to establish a system of peaceful world order, based on the dignity of the individual and dedicated to the free development of each man's capacities. The members

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of the North Atlantic community--the Europeans and ourselves--bear a special responsibility to help achieve this objective. This responsibility derives from the strength of our internal institutions and the wealth of our material resources.

"But we cannot hope to move toward our objective unless we move from strength. Part of that strength must be military strength. But I want to emphasize that we see our military strength not as the means of achieving the kind of world we seek, but as a shield to prevent any other nation from using its military strength, either directly or through threats and intimidation, to frustrate the aspirations we share with all the free peoples of the world. The aggressive use of military strength is foreign to the best traditions of the United States. And, as the President pointed out last week, 'the basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible of a final military solution.'

"What the military component of our national power must do, and what we must see that it is capable of doing, is to assure to the peoples of the Free World the freedom to choose their own course of development.

"Yet the nature and extent of the military power base needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges confronting the Free World is beyond the capacity of any single nation to provide. Since our own security cannot be separated from the security of the rest of the Free World, we necessarily rely on a series of alliances, the most important of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"NATO was born in 1949 out of the confrontation with the Soviet Union that ensued from the breakdown in relations between the former wartime allies. The Soviet Union had absorbed the states of eastern Europe into its own political framework, most dramatically with the Czechoslovakian coup of 1948. It had been fomenting insurrection in Greece, menacing

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Turkey, and encouraging the Communist parties in Western Europe to seize power in the wake of postwar economic disorder. The sharpest threat to Europe came with the first Berlin Crisis when the Russians attempted to blockade the western sectors of the city. Our response was immediate and positive. President TRUMAN ordered an airlift for the isolated population of West Berlin which, in time, denied the Soviets their prize. The Marshall Plan, then in full swing, was assisting the economic recovery of the Western European nations. The Truman Doctrine had brought our weight to bear in Greece and Turkey to prevent the erosion of their independence.

"But Western statesmen concluded that it would be necessary to secure the strength and growth of the North Atlantic community with a more permanent arrangement for its defense. The effective defense of Western Europe could not really be accomplished without a commitment of the United States to that defense for the long term. We made this commitment without hesitation. ARTHUR VANDENBERG, one of the chief architects of NATO, expressed the rationale of the organization in the Senate debate preceding passage of the treaty, 'this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest American idioms, "united we stand, divided we fall." '

"The North Atlantic Alliance is a unique alignment of governments. The provision for the common defense of the members has led to a remarkable degree of military collaboration and diplomatic consultation for a peacetime coalition. The growth of the alliance organization has accelerated as the task of defending the treaty area has increased in scope, size and complexity. NATO has had its stresses and strains, but it has weathered them all.

"Today, NATO is involved in a number of controversies, which must be resolved by achieving a consensus within the organization in order to preserve its strength and unity. The question has arisen whether Senator VANDENBERG's assertion is as true today as it was when he made it 13 years ago. Three arguments have raised this question most sharply:

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"It has been argued that the very success of Western European economic development reduces Europe's need to rely on the U.S. to share in its defenses.

"It has been argued that the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear attack makes us less willing as a partner in the defense of Europe, and hence less effective in deterring such an attack.

"It has been argued that nuclear capabilities are alone relevant in the face of the growing nuclear threat, and that independent national nuclear forces are sufficient to protect the nations of Europe.

"I believe that all of these arguments are mistaken. I think it is worthwhile to expose the U.S. views on these issues as we have presented them to our allies. In our view, the effect of the new factors in the situation, both economic and military, has been to increase the interdependence of national security interests on both sides of the Atlantic, and to enhance the need for the closest coordination of our efforts.

"A central military issue facing NATO today is the role of nuclear strategy. Four facts seem to us to dominate consideration of that role. All of them point in the direction of increased integration to achieve our common defense. First, the Alliance has over-all nuclear strength adequate to any challenge confronting it. Second, this strength not only minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear war, but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur. Third, damage to the civil societies of the Alliance resulting from nuclear warfare could be very grave. Fourth, improved non-nuclear forces, well within Alliance resources, could enhance deterrence of any aggressive moves short of direct, all-out attack on Western Europe.

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"Let us look at the situation today, First, given the current balance of nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for an enemy to take the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made highly unlikely.

"Second, and equally important, the mere fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to a nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place. Not only do nations sometimes act in ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even when acting in a 'rational' way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the way others will react, and the way others will interpret what they are doing. We must hope, indeed I think we have good reason to hope, that all sides will understand this danger, and will refrain from steps that even raise the possibility of such a mutually disastrous misunderstanding. We have taken unilateral steps to reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence. We look forward to the prospect that through arms control, the actual use of these terrible weapons may be completely avoided. It is a problem not just for us in the West, but for all nations that are involved in this struggle we call the Cold War.

"For our part, we feel we and our NATO allies must frame our strategy with this terrible contingency, however remote, in mind. Simply ignoring the problem is not going to make it go away.

"The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

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"The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy any enemy society if driven to it. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

"The strength that makes these contributions to deterrence and to the hope of deterring attack upon civil societies even in wartime does not come cheap. We are confident that our current nuclear programs are adequate and will continue to be adequate for as far into the future as we can reasonably foresee. During the coming fiscal year, the United States plans to spend close to \$15 billion on its nuclear weapons to assure their adequacy. For what this money buys, there is no substitute.

"In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile, the creation of a single additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers.

"In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear contribution to the Alliance is neither obsolete nor dispensable.

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"At the same time, the general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.

"We know that the same forces which are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U.S. is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

"There is, for example, the POLARIS force, which we have been substantially increasing, and which, because of its specially invulnerable nature, is peculiarly well suited to serve as a strategic reserve force. We have already announced the commitment of five of these ships, fully operational, to the NATO Command.

"This sort of commitment has a corollary for the Alliance as a whole. We want and need a greater degree of Alliance participation in formulating nuclear weapons policy to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

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"We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the Alliance as a whole. As the President has said, 'Only through such strength can we be certain of deterring a nuclear strike, or an overwhelming ground attack, on our forces and allies.'

"But let us be quite clear about what we are saying and what we would have to face if the deterrent should fail. This is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear strength, all of us would suffer deeply in the event of major nuclear war.

"We accept our share of this responsibility within the Alliance. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear strength and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I must point out that we do not regard this as a desirable prospect, nor do we believe that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter actions not involving a massive commitment of any hostile force. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than extreme reliance on nuclear weapons to meet our common threat. We do not believe that if the formula,  $e=mc^2$ , had not been discovered, we should all be Communist slaves. On this question, I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.

"With the Alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that any power will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. For the kinds of conflicts, both political and military, most likely to arise in the NATO area, our capabilities for response must not be limited to nuclear weapons alone. The Soviets have superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe today. But that superiority is by no means overwhelming. Collectively, the Alliance has the potential for a successful defense

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against such forces. In manpower alone, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites. We have already shown our willingness to contribute through our divisions now in place on European soil. In order to defend the populations of the NATO countries and to meet our treaty obligations, we have put in hand a series of measures to strengthen our non-nuclear power. We have added \$10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the call-up temporarily gave us. The number of U.S. combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.

"We expect that our allies will also undertake to strengthen further their non-nuclear forces, and to improve the quality and staying power of these forces. These achievements will complement our deterrent strength. With improvements in Alliance ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, we can be assured that no deficiency exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.

"I have described very briefly the United States' views on the role of nuclear forces in the strategy of the Alliance. I have pointed out that the Alliance necessarily depends, for the deterrence of general nuclear war, on the powerful and well protected nuclear forces of the United States, which are necessarily committed to respond to enemy nuclear strikes wherever they may be made. At the same time, I have indicated the need for substantial

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non-nuclear forces within the Alliance to deal with situations where a nuclear response may be inappropriate or simply not believable. Throughout I have emphasized that we in the Alliance all need each other.

"I want to remind you also that the security provided by military strength is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the achievement of our foreign policy goals, including our goals in the field of arms control and disarmament. Military security provides a base on which we can build Free World strength through the economic advances and political reforms which are the object of the President's programs, like the Alliance for Progress and the Trade Expansion legislation. Only in a peaceful world can we give full scope to the individual potential, which is for us the ultimate value.

"A distinguished European visited the United States last month as a guest of the President. ANDRE MALRAUX, French Minister of State for Cultural Affairs, is an eminent novelist and critic. He led an archaeological expedition to Cambodia and fought in the Spanish Civil War and the French Resistance Movement. MALRAUX paid a moving tribute to our nation when he said: 'The only nation that has waged war but not worshipped it, that has won the greatest power in the world but not sought it, that has wrought the greatest weapon of death but has not wished to wield it... May it inspire men with dreams worthy of its action.'

"The community of learning to which you have been admitted carries with it great privileges. It also carries great responsibilities. And perhaps the greatest of these is to help ensure the wise use of our national power. Let me paraphrase MALRAUX: May your dreams be worthy of action and your actions be shaped by your dreams."

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LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED  
WHO COULD FURNISH NO  
INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION (u)

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The individuals listed hereinafter have been interviewed concerning their knowledge of the activities of HANSON W. BALDWIN and any information they possessed as to how he obtained the material appearing in his article in "The New York Times" dated July 26, 1962. These individuals were asked basically the following questions and were unable to furnish any information of pertinence.

Have you read an article by HANSON BALDWIN which appeared in "The New York Times" July 26, 1962?

Do you know HANSON BALDWIN?

Do you know how he obtained the information which appeared in this article?

Do you know anyone who does know HANSON BALDWIN?

Have you seen HANSON BALDWIN in contact with anyone during the past two months?

Do you know any press representatives of "The New York Times"?

(U) Have you ever discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] ~~[S-SECRET]~~ with any unauthorized person?

(U) Who have you discussed the contents of [NIE 11-8-62] ~~[S-SECRET]~~ with?

Are you familiar with the term "image interpretation"?

(U) Have you seen [NIE 11-8-62] ~~[S-SECRET]~~ or any of the drafts prepared prior to the final approval of [NIE 11-8-62] ~~[S-SECRET]~~?

Do you feel the publication of BALDWIN's article is in the special interest of any specific agency, department or any specific program?

Do you have any information which might assist in determining how BALDWIN obtained the information which appears in this article?

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[redacted]  
to Dr. JEROME B. WIESNER, Special  
Assistant to the President for Sciences  
and Technology, The White House  
EDWARD A. MC DERMOTT, Director, Office of  
Emergency Planning

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[redacted] Information  
Liaison, NSC

DAVID E. BELL, Director, Bureau of Budget

[redacted]  
International Division, Bureau of Budget

[redacted] Budget Examiner,

International Division, Bureau of Budget

Referral/Consult

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ADAM YARMOLINSKY, Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense  
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN W. O'NEILL, USAF,  
Director of Defense Research and  
Engineering  
MAJOR GENERAL NILS O. OHMAN, USAF, Senior  
Air Force member, WSEG  
HENRY S. ROWEN, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
(Planning and NSC), Office of Assistant  
Secretary of Defense (ISA)  
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN M. LEE, Director, Policy  
Planning Staff, Office of Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, Office of Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (ISA)  
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Directorate for Systems Analysis, Office  
of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)  
[redacted] Assistant General Counsel, Office  
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics)  
[redacted] Assistant General Counsel, Office  
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)  
[redacted] Security Services Branch,  
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Public Affairs)  
CAPTAIN [redacted] USN, Joint Strategic  
Survey Council, JCS  
COLONEL [redacted] USA, Joint Strategic  
Survey Council, JCS  
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Joint Staff, JCS  
MAJOR GENERAL J. M. REYNOLDS, USAF, Vice Director,  
JCS  
MAJOR GENERAL J. A. HEINTGES, USA, Deputy  
Director, Joint Staff, JCS

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CAG:kjl

MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS, USA,  
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JCS, Member USIB

CAPTAIN [ ] USN, Joint  
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COLONEL [ ] USA, Long  
Range Projects, Plans and Policy  
Branch, Intelligence Directorate,  
JCS

COLONEL [ ] USA, JCS

BRIGADIER GENERAL F. T. UNGER, USAF,  
Director, Operations, JCS

BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN H. BURBA, USA,  
Deputy Director of Operations, JCS

BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL J. FONTANA, USMC,  
Deputy Director, Operations, JCS

COLONEL [ ] USAF, Operations,  
JCS

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL S. EMRICK, USAF,  
Director, Plans and Policy, JCS

REAR ADMIRAL DRAPER L. KAUFFMAN, Deputy  
Director, Plans and Policy, JCS

BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN O. TURNAGE,  
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CAPTAIN [ ] USN, Special  
Assistant to Director, DIA

COLONEL [ ] USA, Executive  
Officer, DIA

REAR ADMIRAL SAMUEL B. FRANKEL, USN,  
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COLONEL [ ] USAF, Assistant  
Executive, DIA

COLONEL [ ] USA, Inspector  
General DIA

COLONEL [ ] Special Activities  
Office, DIA

FIRST LIEUTENANT [ ] USAF,  
Intelligence (Security) Office,  
Special Activities Office, DIA

[ ] Special  
Activities Office, DIA

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MAJOR [REDACTED] USAF, Chief,  
Briefing Branch, SAO, Support  
Division, DIA

COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, DIA

COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF,  
DIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED]  
USAF, DIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED]  
USA, DIA

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FRANK J. DENNY, Director, National  
Indications Center, Department of  
Defense

NILS A. LENNARTSON, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, (Public Affairs),  
Department of Defense

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] ACSI, USA  
REAR ADMIRAL VERNON L. LOWRANCE, USN, Director  
of Naval Intelligence.  
REAR ADMIRAL HAROLD G. BOWEN, JR., USN, Deputy  
Director of Naval Intelligence.  
CAPTAIN GORDON K. NICODEMUS, USN, Acting Assistant  
Director of Naval Intelligence.

[REDACTED] ONI  
COMMANDER [REDACTED] USN, ONI.  
VICE ADMIRAL RUFUS E. ROSE, USN, Commandant,  
Industrial College of the Armed Forces  
ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE, USN (retired), Former Chief  
of Naval Operations  
BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD D. CURTIN, Director,  
Office of Space Systems, USAF  
MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD M. MONTGOMERY, Assistant Vice  
Chief of Staff, USAF  
BRIGADIER GENERAL PRENTISS D. WYNNE, JR., Director,  
Directorate of Warning and Threat Assessments,  
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEAN C. STROTHER, Deputy Chief of  
Staff, Operations, USAF  
MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES B. WESTOVER, Assistant Deputy  
Chief of Staff, Operations, USAF  
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER, Director, Operational  
Requirements, USAF  
MAJOR GENERAL SAM W. AGEE, Director of Operations,  
USAF  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES FERGUSON, Deputy Chief of  
Staff, Research and Technology, USAF  
MAJOR GENERAL CECIL H. CHILDS, Assistant Deputy  
Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, USAF  
COLONEL [REDACTED] Office of Information, USAF  
COLONEL [REDACTED] Chief Aerospace Force  
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CAPTAIN [REDACTED] Office of Assistant Chief of  
Staff, Intelligence, USAF  
GENERAL FREDERIC H. SMITH, JR., USAF (retired), Former  
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF  
MAJOR [REDACTED] Evaluations Branch, Assistant  
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF,  
National Guard Bureau

(S)

Referral/Consult

GEORGE W. BALL, Under Secretary of State,  
United States Department of State  
THOMAS L. HUGHES, Deputy Director, Bureau of  
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Director, Bureau of Intelligence and  
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HENRY H. FOWLER, Under Secretary of the  
Treasury, Department of Treasury

GEORGE B. PLEAT, Deputy to Director of  
Intelligence, AEC

[REDACTED] Intelligence Specialist,  
AEC

[REDACTED] Intelligence Specialist,  
AEC

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In Reply, Please Refer to  
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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August 28, 1962

Title **ARTICLE BY HANSON F. BALDWIN IN  
"THE NEW YORK TIMES", JULY 26, 1962**

Character **ESPIONAGE - R**

Reference **Report dated and captioned as above**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

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